Abstract. In the conclusion of [7] Halpern and Moses expressed their interest in a logical system in which one could talk about knowledge and belief (and belief about knowledge, knowledge about belief and so on), We investigate such systems. In the first part of the paper knowledge and belief, without time, are considered.
Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge and belief has been recently proposed as a tool for describing distributed systems, as well as many real-life situations. Examples include synchronization and cooperation protocols, cryptographic systems, games, economics, knowledge bases and intelligent programs.
One of the outstanding questions is what is the best concept for analysing such situations: knowledge or belief. Following previous authors [5] it may be considered that the main difference between knowledge and belief is that when one knows p, then p is true, but when one believes p, then p must not be true. Some recent works examine the concept of knowledge [6, 7, 9] and others the concept of belief [ 10, 2, 3] . We think as suggested by Halpern and Moses in [7] , that for some applications a good system has to be able to talk about belief and knowledge.
We want to express statements such as "person i believes p and knows q", or "person i believes that if he does not know p, then q is true", and so on. In this paper we propose a logical system for many people that includes belief, knowledge, common knowledge and common belief. Following Lewis [ll] the notion of common belief of some state of affairs A in a population P holds if and only if:
"(1) everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds;
(2) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds; (3) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P.. . " Lewis [ 1 l] calls this concept common knowledge, but we think the term common belief is more appropriate.
The notion of common belief is much weaker than the notion of common knowledge. Even when a is true and is common belief, a must not be common knowledge. We think that in some cases, in particular those envisaged by Lewis, common belief is the proper concept and not common knowledge.
Another
issue is how belief and knowledge are changing in time. In some circumstances, one cannot say anything nontrivial about the effect of the passage of time on knowledge or belief, but in others one would like to state that knowledge is never lost (see [9] ) and that beliefs do not change without reason. When discussing the relation of belief and time one cannot escape the conclusion that there is more than one notion of belief. So, we add "time" to our system and for two different notions of belief we suggest different axioms to express the persistence of beliefs and common beliefs.
Finally we use one of our systems to partly analyse the "wise men" puzzle, (see [l] ) in a completely formal way.
Logic of knowledge and belief
We now consider knowledge and belief alone (without time).
The language
Suppose a set Pvar of propositional variables and a finite set People = def { 1,2, . . . , n} of participants are given. The following rules define the set of formulas lY
(1) A propositional variable p E Pvar is a formula If a and b are formulas of r and if i E People, then the following are formulas of I-:
(2) ia (not a) and a v b (a or b), (3) Kia (i knows a) and B,a (i believes a).
(4) Yta (a is common knowledge) and %?I (a is common belief). In this language one can express pure knowledge formulas, pure belief formulas, but one can also express formulas like K,a + B,a that means that person i believes what he knows, or 1Bia f, K,lB,a that means that person i does not believe a iff he knows that he does not believe a. Let us define the connectives Z? and 9 by 
I c People
The formula 8a means that everybody knows a and 9a means that everybody believes a.
The models
We use possible-worlds semantics for knowledge and belief. Person i knows a if a is true in all the worlds that according to his knowledge could be possible, and person i believes a if a is true in all the worlds that could be possible according to his beliefs. We shall now define models in the style of Kripke with two binary relations for each person: one relation corresponding to worlds possible according to knowledge, and the other relation corresponding to the worlds believed possible.
Definition 2.1. A model JZ? is a structure (S, s, 1, =, , -2, . . . , =,,, -, , -2, . . , -,)
where (1) S is a set, elements of S will be called states; (2) s E S is the real state of the world; (3) 1:s+2p""' says which of the propositional variables are true in each state; (4) for every i E People, the relations si and si satisfy the following rules:
(a) =, is an equivalence relation (reflexive, transitive and symmetric), (b) -i is serial (for all s E S there is some f E S such that s -, t), (c) -I is contained in =; (-, G =,), (d) foranys,t,uESifs=,tand t-iu,thens-,u.
The intuitive meanings of the relations -i and --; are the following. Two states s, u E S are in relation si if the knowledge of person i cannot enable him to distinguish between s and u. Two states s, u are in relation -; if in states s person i believes that state u is a state the world could be in. The relation si is an equivalence relation and its intuitive meaning is that all the states in S are divided into equivalence classes, and if person i is in state u E S and if u is member of the equivalence class E L S, then all the states that are member of E (including u) are possible according to his knowledge.
In every state that person i could be in, there is at least one state that he believes is possible, and therefore -i is serial.
It is easier to believe something than to know it, because one knows only true things. So one's beliefs can enable him to distinguish between more states than one's knowledge, and therefore there could be some states s, u E S such that s =, u . . , -n ) is given. For any state u we shall define the truth value of any formula a E lY K+l,y, = true e for all states t such that u =; t, one has al',, = true, BiaI", = true e for all states t such that u -i t, one has ~1,'~~ = true, Xull;, = true ti for all states t such that u = * t, one has ~1.;~ = true, %ul~, = true e for all states t such that u -* t, one has u],!~, = true.
The definition
above is clearly a correct definition by induction on the structure of the formula a. Satisfaction and validity will now be defined in the usual way. 
The logics
Our logics are best viewed as composed of a number of levels. is common belief, then everybody believes that it is common belief); (A13) B(a -+ Su)-+ %I + L&J (induction rule). The lust and most interesting level describes the interrelation between knowledge and belief, and betweeen common knowledge and common belief.
(A14) K,a + B,a for any i E People (one believes everything one knows); (A15) B,a+KiB,a for any iE People (one knows about his own beliefs: beliefs are conscious); (A16) YCa + 93~1 (anything that is common knowledge is common belief). Axiom (A16) is needed to ensure that theorems are common beliefs. We want to emphasize that the interesting formula B,a + B,K,a is not included in our system. It would imply tB,ut,K,a.
We now list some interesting theorems that can be proved from the axioms above and will be used later: 
Axioms (AO)-(A16) and the rules of inference (RO)-(Rl)
are sound and complete for the notion of validity defined above and validity may be decided in deterministic exponential time.
Proof. The proof of the soundness is obvious. The completeness result proceeds by building a "universal" model, i.e., a model in which states are labelled by traces of suitable size in such a way that formulas true at state s are exactly those formulas that appear in the label of s. This proof is similar to the corresponding proof in [12] , but is different in some interesting details. Some standard notions, such as complete and consistent theory are supposed to be known: see, for example, [12] for definitions.
First we shall define a set of formulas to be considered.
Remark:
In all the following definitions i E People and i is implicitly universally quantified.
Definition 2.7.
If a E r, we define A(a) to be the smallest subset of r satisfying: 
The sets in which all beliefs are true are of special interest. Using the theorems that were mentioned before, it is easy to prove that if T, G r and T,G r are consistent and complete theories, then
(1) TI and T2 are standard sets on r; (2) T,~~T,iff forall bEr,K,bET,jbET,;
We may prove general properties about the relations -i and = ;. 
We want to remark that the restrictions of =, and -, on a subset of r keep the properties of Lemma 2.12.
Lemma 2.13. Let D, and D, be subsets of r. If E g r is closed under subformulas, then
Proof. Obvious. 0
We shall now define an iteration process of elimination on the standard sets on A(a). The main goal of this process is to reach a situation in which we are left with a group of traces which can be used in constructing a universal model. B;B,b, A B,B,b, A . . . A B,B,b, A B,lBic, and we have to prove that there exists an F' E 9 such that b EZ F. If G is a subset of r, we define the characteristic formula of G by xG =def AOEG a. The characteristic formula XG is not in general in G, but it is easy to prove that for any consistent and complete theory T, G = T n A( a)e,yc E T. We may define +!I =def VFp9 xF. Notice that for any consistent and complete theory T, T n A(a) E 9e $ E T. We have to prove that C$ + jji K& Suppose not. Then there is a consistent and complete theory S such that Ic, E S and A\iKilC, .@ S. It follows that there exists aj E People such that K,I,!J E S; therefore there exists a consistent and complete theory S' and S =j S' and 4 @ S'. We may conclude that S'n A(a) $9. But S zj S' and therefore S n A(a) EjS'nA(u) by Lemma 2.13, and SnA(u)E9 and we may conclude that S' n A (a) E 9. A contradiction.(*) So, from F$ + /ji K,$ it follows that t-X[+ + /ji Ki$] by (Rl), and by using the induction rule (A7) we may conclude that +tJ + XI,!J. But txD + 4 because DE 9; therefore txD + XI+!J. Now we may finish the proof that there exists an F'E 9 such that b & F. Suppose that VF E 9, b E F. It follows that t$ + b; then tX$ + Xb and t-,yD + Xb; but x0 E T and then Ytb E T and we may conclude that Xb E D, contradiction. by using the induction rule (A13) we may conclude that t/ji B,$ + 93$. We have to prove that +xD + B& Suppose not. Then B,$E T since xD E T.
Therefore there exists a consistent and complete theory T' and T -i T' and $ & T'. We may conclude that T' n A (a ) @ 9. But T -i T' and therefore T n A (U ) -i T' n A(u) by Lemma 2.13, and TnA(u)c9
and we may conclude that T'nA(u)EB, a contradiction.
So, FX~+ /ji Bi$ and k/j; Bill,+ ?&,!I; therefore, F-_x[,+ a+, and we may finish the proof as in the previous case. 0
Lemma 2.16. The restrictions of the relations si and -i on W have the following properties:
(1) all the properties of Dejinition 2.1:
is an equivalent relation (reflexive, transitive and symmetric), (b) -i is serial ($or all s E W there is some t E W such that s -I t). (c) -i is contained in si (-in cz), (d) for any s, t, u E W ifs Ei t and t -i U, then s -i u;
(2 Proof. Properties (a), (c), and (d) were proved in Lemma 2.12. Properties (b) and (2)- (5) s, 1, =,, -2 ,. . . ) = n, -,, -*, . . .) -,,) that does not satisfy a is defined in the following way:
(1) s= w, 
Time
We may now extend our logic to capture time by adding new modal operators to the language. The new operators are 0 (next), 0 (always) and Until (until).
We think that when talking about how beliefs are changing in time, one must distinguish between at least two different notions of belief. First, belief can mean readiness to bet. "Person i believes that this afternoon it will rain" means, operationally, that he will take his raincoat with him in the morning. If it does not rain, no problem, he will be slightly inconvenienced by having to take his raincoat back and forth. But a second acceptation is possible, in which belief is a much more serious matter. One cannot allow reality to contradict one's beliefs because that would be too traumatic an experience.
Therefore one may believe only things that may not, ever, under any circumstances, be shown to be false. One may not believe that it will rain because he could come to know that his belief was erroneous and he does not want to take that chance. One may believe things that one knows to be true or things that cannot be proven false. For example, one may believe the Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) since its negation is not a theorem of set theory. This meaning of belief is perhaps close to the meaning of religious belief. So, talking about this last meaning of belief (the "serious" meaning), if person i believes that something will be true tomorrow, it must be that he knows that he will not discover tomorrow that it is wrong. Therefore the following axiom seems reasonable for this second interpretation:
(A17) B,Oa + K,OlK,la for any iE People. Now, if person i believes that tomorrow a will be true, since he cannot find tomorrow that he is wrong, he has all the reasons to persist in his beliefs and we may accept (Al8) B,Oa + OB,a for any in People.
If (A18) is accepted, one can also accept (A19) !33Oa -+ 0%~.
Now one may notice that (A17) is provable from (A18) and forget (A17). Fagin and Halpern in [2] argue that (A18) "is moving us away from our goal of capturing realistic notions of belief". Indeed, in everyday life, the verb "believe" is probably used with a meaning of the type "readiness to bet". A logical, nonnumeric, convincing treatment of such a notion is problematic.
In such an interpretation of belief, (the "weak" meaning) axioms (A18) and (A19) do not seem reasonable.
Somebody may believe (in the "weak" meaning) that it will rain tomorrow, but tomorrow he will not believe so. Nevertheless, if one believes that tomorrow a is true, one believes (today) that tomorrow one will continue to believe a. Therefore we propose the axiom (for the first interpretation):
(A20) B,Ou + B,OB,u for any in People.
This axiom says nothing about the future and we need some more expressive axiom to capture what happens to our beliefs in time. No one likes to change his beliefs, and one shall change them only if one is forced to do so. For example, somebody who drove to his office in the morning and left his car in the parking lot believes that his car is in the parking lot and in good mechanical condition.
He will continue to believe it unless a friend of his calls him to tell him that his car has been damaged by another car or has been stolen. Then he stops believing that his car is in the parking lot, and he knows the opposite. We want to say that if person i believes something, he will keep on believing it until he knows it is false. The way to say so is:
(A21) B,Ou + OB,u v OK,lu for any i E People.
The following is provable from A21, but weaker:
The meaning of this axiom is that one stops believing in something when one believes it is false. For example, does the driver (from the previous example) know that his car was damaged?! He did not see his car, and maybe his friend was joking?! An open problem is: find a natural family of models for which the systems considered above are complete. The ways by which common knowledge and common belief may be achieved in a distributed environment are fundamentally different. Halpern and Moses [6] proved that, in order for common knowledge to be attainable in a system, the system must be capable of simultaneity.
This limitation is a direct consequence of the following theorem: Yta *K,.XL for all i E People. On the contrary, the formula:
B,!Z'u + 6%~ is not valid. Note that %3a ++ .%%a is valid. Therefore it could be that q B,%3a and OUB,%u and OOClB,% . . . and at instant n (n = IPeople]) ?F%u will be true and will be common belief. We just described a system in which common belief is gained and which is not capable of simultaneity. Similarly, in a system in which, at first, a is common belief, but later on, agent i stops believing a is common belief, common belief is lost, without any simultaneity being necessary. We may conclude that common belief seems a more realistic notion than common knowledge, which can be attainable without simultaneity.
The puzzle of the wise men
As an example of the possible use of the logic of belief, common belief and time (without knowledge),
we provide a new analysis of the puzzle that was analysed in [9] . We use the system that includes a suitable axiomatization of the temporal logic of linear time (see [4] ), the axioms (A8)- (A13) and (A19), the rules of inference (RO) and a common belief generalization rule: if tu, then t!%'u.
We think that axiom (A19) seems very reasonable since common belief is a strong notion. Therefore, if it is common belief that tomorrow a will be true, it seems reasonable that tomorrow a will be common belief. The puzzle could be told the following way. Once upon a time, the happy chairman of the Computer Science Department at Utopia University was told by the President that the good financial situation of the university allowed for some pay increases in his department.
The chairman decided to distribute the pay increases among his three professors in a way that would provide for both fun and justice. He asked all three professors to a room and showed them five hats: two white hats and three black hats. He told them: at exactly 12:00 noon I will turn off the light and place a hat on each of your three heads; you are not allowed to put those hats off your head; I will destroy the two remaining hats and will not know myself which of the hats have been destroyed; then I will leave the room and switch the light on; at 1:00 p.m. I will come back and ask whether somebody can tell the colour of his hat; a wrong answer means unemployment, a correct answer means a large pay increase; if one (at least) of you speaks at 1:00 p.m., then the game is finished; if nobody speaks at that time, then I will come back at 2:00 p.m. and ask the same question but offer only a smaller pay increase to anybody who can tell the colour of his hat; this will go on at each hour (for decreasing financial rewards) until one of you speaks up. The chairman did as he said, left the room and switched the light on. As soon as he sat down in his office a telephone call from his wife asked him in no uncertain terms to be home at 2:30 p.m. to greet her parents. He agreed. The question is: how did the chairman know he could leave the university in time, i.e., that he would not have to be back for the 3:00 p.m. visit to his staff?
It should be pointed out that the chairman cannot indeed exclude a possible cooperation between his professors but he cannot either count on such a cooperation, things being as they are. Of interest to us in this puzzle are both the kind of reasoning used by the professors and the chairman, and the exact list of all assumptions hidden in this puzzle. The notion of common belief will prove itself useful in both respects. We think that this analysis of the puzzle is sharper and more realistic than the analysis using common knowledge that was provided in [9] , and we may compare them later. For the description of the, sometimes hidden, assumptions and the participants' reasoning we shall use the following basic propositions (propositional variables). To minimize propositional variables, we build some of the assumptions in the interpretation of those variables. It would not be difficult to state exactly those assumptions by using some more variables. The professors will be numbered 1, 2, 3. The instants of time considered are 12:00 noon, 1:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m. and so on. We use the propositional variable b, to mean "professor i has, now, a black hat on his head", and wi to mean "professor i has, now, a white hat on his head". For i = 1,. . . ,3 we use the propositional variable d, to mean "professor i declares, now, the colour of his hat". We shall also use the following notations: the formula uk means "there are at least k black hats".
We now proceed to describe the assumptions of the puzzle. Assumption 1 is that it is common belief that one has either a black hat or a white hat.
This assumption is weaker than the corresponding hidden assumption in [9] . In [9] the assumptions that lb, is equivalent to wi is built in the description of the puzzle and therefore it is common knowledge that hats are either black or white; here however it is only common belief. Therefore one of the hats could be yellow. Assumption 2 is that it is common belief that hats do not change colours and do not move from one head to another.
The similar assumption (HI) from [9] is much stronger than this one. In (CBHI) the professors believe that the hats do not change colours and do not move from one head to another and that everyone believes that hats do not change colours and so on, but they do not know it and it could also be that it is not true. logical system which puts genera1 sensible restriction on the way one acquires beliefs is an open problem.
The proof is done in three main parts. First we prove that it is common belief that at 1:00 p.m. if it is common belief that no one speaks up, then it is common belief that there are at least two black hats. In the second part we prove that it is common belief that at 1:00 p. m. if it is common belief that there are at least two black hats, then if at 2:00 p.m. it is common belief that no one speaks up, then at 2:00 it will be common belief that at 3:00 p.m everybody will speak up. In the parts of the proof described above we use only the assumptions that begin with common belief ((CBHI), (CBSR), (CBTWH), (CBNB), (CBWB)) and not assumption (NDl) that considers reality. We use this last axiom only in the third part when we prove our final claim by putting our results from the previous parts together.
The main stages of the proof will be described.
(CBNB) + %I(~;+Biwj) for i=l,..., 3,j=l,..., 3, i#j, 
by (2) .
(CBHI) + %((~,++Ocu,), 
by ( by (7) and since all the hypotheses begin by !Z. This is the end of the first part of our proof.
(CBWB) + ~~(cx,Aw,+~~) for i=l,..., 3, j=l,...., 3, i#j,
by propositional calculus.
(CBWB) + L%(Bicu,~Biwj+Bibi) for i=l,._., 3,j=l,..., 3, i#j,
by (9) and axioms (A8) and (All) and theorems (T9)(TlO). 
by (lo), (1) and axiom (All).
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI)
by (11). (12)
(15) 
